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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 890544-CA 
v. : 
RICHARD ALVIN LIKES, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of burglary of a 
business, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202 (1978), in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and 
for Millard County, State of Utah, the Honorable Cullen Y. 
Christensen, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was defendant's sixth amendment right to confront 
witnesses against him violated? 
2. Did defendant's confession, admitted at trial, 
violate defendant's right not to testify against himself and was 
that confession voluntary? 
Although defendant was convicted of theft, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978), a second degree felony pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(b)(i) (1978) (amended 1989), as well 
as burglary of a business, he has chosen to appeal only the 
burglary conviction. Judgment was entered in accordance with the 
two convictions on August 23, 1989 (R. 131-136). 
3. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 
motion to suppress evidence? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. IV i 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Richard Alvin Likes, was charged with 
burglary of a business and theft (R. 10, 11)* Defendant filed 
motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant 
based on the belief the evidence was not in plain view (R. 26-
27). Defendant also moved to suppress defendant's "alleged 
confession" (R. 26-27, 29-30). The trial court denied 
defendant's motion(s) (R. 53-58, T. 216). Defendant was 
convicted on both counts after a jury trial (R. 151-52, case fi 
no. 1085, State of Utah v. Kevin Jon Nield). Defendant appeals 
only the burglary conviction. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of May 16, 1988, at approximately 9:30 
to 10:00 p.m., Gerald Freeman, the owner of Fillmore Diesel, 
Fillmore, Utah, received information that his business might be 
burglarized that night (T. 122). He called the Millard County 
Sheriff's Department and asked for an extra patrol that evening 
(T. 82, 122). Deputy Sheriff Scott Corry received Mr. Freeman's 
call at 10:00 p.m. and checked the diesel shop at midnight. At 
that time he found the doors locked and secured (T. 83). When he 
returned at 2:30 a.m. on May 17, he found that the chain link 
securing the west bay doors had been cut (T. 84). He called Mr. 
Freeman, who immediately came to the shop and began to determine 
what had been taken (T. 86, 127). During his initial 
investigation of the burglary, Deputy Corry took photographs of 
two sets of greasy footprints left on the concrete floor of the 
shop (T. 86-87). 
Later that morning (May 17) Deputy Corry spoke with Mr. 
Freeman, who was then able to give him a preliminary list of 
missing items. That list included a sander, mig welder, power 
tools and hand tools (Suppression Hearing (S.H.) 37; T. 127). 
Because of the size of the shop and the many tools used there, a 
complete inventory of stolen items was not completed until May 18 
or 19 (S.H. 36; T. 28). Later on May 17 Mr. Freeman received 
information that he could find his missing tools at Kevin Nield's 
apartment (S.H. 48-49). He contacted Deputy Corry who obtained a 
search warrant for Mr. Nield's apartment and several vehicles. 
The description of the property subject to seizure under the 
search warrant was as follows: 
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shop equipment, air tools, mig welder, desk 
calculator, auto tools stolen from Gerald D. 
Freeman, Fillmore Diesel, Fillmore, Utah on 
5/17/88 during a burglary. 
(R. 9). At 12:15 a.m. on May 18, Deputy Corry searched the Nield 
apartment and seized numerous items, including a pair of 18 inch 
bolt cutters, which were found in the clothes closet in the front 
room of the apartment (R. 12; S.H. 9, 20; T. 88, 90). Defendant, 
who was then living in the Nield apartment, and Kevin Nield (co-
defendant) were then arrested and charged with burglary and 
theft. Mr. Freeman subsequently identified the bolt cutters as 
possibly his, since he was required by state law to have bolt 
cutters for his wreckers, and he had found an 18 inch set missing 
from one of his vehicles (S.H. 39-40; T. 129-30). 
After defendant's arrest he was taken to the Millard 
County Jail, where he spent the remainder of the night (T. 204). 
At approximately 1:00 p.m. on May 18, Deputy Corry began 
interviewing defendant concerning the Fillmore Diesel burglary 
(T. 206). In the course of the interview, which lasted 
approximately three and one-half hours, defendant confessed that 
the co-defendant and he had broken into Fillmore Diesel, had 
taken several items and had hidden them in the Fillmore area (T. 
210, 222). Defendant filed a motion to suppress his confession, 
arguing generally that the confession was not voluntary (R. 26-
28). At trial the court heard testimony and argument on 
defendant's motion, made factual findings and denied the motion 
(T. 216). 
Defendant also filed a motion to suppress the seized 
bolt cutters, arguing that they were not in plain view in the co-
defendant's apartment (R. 26-27). After a hearing on the motion 
2 
to suppress, the trial court denied the motion (R. 53-58). 
At the joint trial of defendant and co-defendant Nield# 
the bolt cutters were admitted along with testimony from an 
expert from the Utah State Crime Laboratory positively 
identifying the bolt cutters as those that had been used to cut 
the chain link at Fillmore Diesel (T. 55). The State also 
offered into evidence a pair of gym shoes taken from defendant. 
Deputy Corry identified their tread design as being "similar or 
the same" as the tread on the footprints he photographed at 
Fillmore Diesel on the night of the burglary (T. 96). Also 
received into evidence were a sander, two jack stands and a mig 
welder, found in a box underneath a pile of "junk" in the shed 
behind the Nield apartment in October 1988, and turned over to 
the sheriff on January 5, 1989 (T. 98-100, 243-49). Mr. Freeman 
positively identified the mig welder as his and testified that he 
believed the jack stands and sanders were also his because they 
looked like his, they were found with the mig welder and his were 
The trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress is captioned 
with only co-defendant Kevin Jon Nield's name, but it includes 
defendant's criminal case number, 1082 (R. 59). Defendant did 
not argue his "plain view" position at the suppresssion hearing 
and did not submit a memorandum in support of his motion. The 
co-defendant argued that the search warrant used to seize the 
bolt cutters lacked sufficient particularity. The court heard 
oral argument on that issue at the suppression hearing, and the 
co-defendant filed a memorandum in support of his motion (Record 
of Co-defendant at 66-71). Consequently, the trial court's 
ruling addressed only the particularity issue. Nevertheless, 
defendant's case number was captioned in the ruling and defendant 
apparently accepts the fact that his motion to suppress was 
denied. Therefore, the State, in its argument, assumes the fact 
of the denial of defendant's motion to suppress the bolt cutters. 
See Point III, infra. 
still missing (T. 133-34). 
Deputy Corry testified concerning his interview of 
defendant after his arrest and recounted defendant's confession 
(T. 222). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's admission of testimony concerning 
defendant's confession did not violate the sixth amendment 
because defendant fully cross-examined the witness who took the 
confession. 
The trial court properly admitted the testimony 
concerning defendant's confession, correctly ruling that the 
confession was voluntary. 
The trial court properly admitted the seized bolt 
cutters. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY 
CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION DID NOT 
VIOLATE THE SIXTH AMENDMENT. 
Defendant seemingly argues that the introduction of his 
confession at trial without the opportunity to fully cross-
examine Deputy Corry, who took the confession, violates the sixth 
3 
amendment to the United States Constitution. (Br. of App. at 6). 
3 
Points I and III of defendant's brief are identical to Points I 
and II, respectively, of his co-defendant, Kevin Nield's, 
appellate brief, filed previously in this Court. Co-defendant 
Nield's argument was responded to fully by the State in a brief 
which is attached hereto as Addendum A and incorporated herein. 
That argument attacked the admission at trial of defendant Likes' 
confession, as testified to by Deputy Corry, as being a violation 
of co-defendant Nield's right to confront witnesses against him, 
i.e. defendant Likes, who declined to testify. Such an argument 
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That argument is not supported by the record. Defendant had 
ample opportunity to cross-examine Deputy Corry at trial, and he 
did so (T. 223-28)• Defendant's assertion is meritless. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED TESTIMONY 
CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION. 
Defendant argues that his confession, admitted at 
trial, was done so in violation of his rights not to testify 
against himself, as found in Utah Const, art. I, § 12 and Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1982) (Br. of App. at 14). However, 
defendant failed to assert that ground for suppression below, and 
an appellate court in this state will not entertain such an 
objection for the first time on appeal. In State v. Johnson, 771 
P.2d 326 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 
1989), this Court stated that "where a defendant fails to assert 
a particular ground for suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence 
in the trial court, an appellate court will not consider that 
ground on appeal." Ld. at 328 (quoting State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 
656, 660 (Utah 1985)). See also State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53 
(Utah) cert, denied 454 U.S. 1057 (1981) ("There is nothing in 
the record to indicate that the point now urged upon this Court 
was unavailable or unknown to defendant at the time he filed his 
motion to suppress, and to entertain the point now would be to 
sanction the practice of withholding positions that should 
properly be presented to the trial court but which may be 
Cont. is utterly inapplicable to the instant case and requires 
no analytical response. 
withheld for the purpose of seeking a reversal on appeal and a 
new trial or dismissal•"). 
Defendant further argues that his confession was 
coerced and not voluntary (Br, of App. at 14). However, 
defendant cites no authority in support of his position and 
provides no legal analysis. Rule 24(a)(9) of both the Utah 
Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals states that an 
appellate brief "shall contain the contentions of the appellant 
with respect to the issues presented and the reasons therefore, 
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
record relied on." In State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 
(Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court declined to rule on an issue 
because the defendant had "fail[ed] to support his argument by 
any legal analysis or authority." See also State v. Wareham, 772 
P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (footnote omitted) ("A brief must 
contain some support for each contention. [Defendant's] brief 
totally fails to provide any reasons to support [his] contention. 
. . . We therefore must disregard this issue."); State v. 
Pascoe, 774 P.2d 512, 514 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("[A]ppellant 
failed to support his [this] contention with legal analysis or 
authority. We, therefore, decline to rule on it."). Because 
defendant fails to substantively argue his position, the Court 
has no basis from which to evaluate or rule on his contention. 
Should this Court consider the merits of defendant's 
contention, the Utah Supreme Court has established the standard 
applicable for reviewing the "voluntariness" of a confession. In 
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989), the Court stated that 
the State has the burden of proving that a defendant's confession 
was voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence and that 
voluntariness is determined by the totality of the circumstances. 
Id. at 890 (citing State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 463-64 (Utah 
1988)). Absent clear error or abuse of discretion a trial 
court's ruling will not be reversed. State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 
385, 392 (Utah 1986). See also State v. Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348, 
1349 (Utah 1986). 
In the instant case Deputy Corry, who interviewed 
defendant and took his confession, testified concerning that 
interview. He stated that defendant had been arrested between 
1:30 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. on May 17 [sic] (the arrest was actually 
made on May 18), taken to the Millard County Jail and booked and 
put in a holding cell (T. 203-04). The facility was heated, a 
bed was available and defendant had access to restrooms up until 
the time of the interview later on May 18 (T. 204-06). Deputy 
Corry testified that defendant would have had two opportunities 
to eat prior to the 1:00 p.m. interview, a morning meal at 8:00 
a.m. and a noon meal (T. 205). The interview took place at the 
Millard County Security Center in a room approximately 10 feet by 
14 feet and lasted approximately three and one-half hours (T. 
205-06, 211). Defendant appeared alert to Deputy Corry at the 
time of the interview, and his Miranda rights were read to him 
prior to the start of the interview (T. 207). Deputy Corry 
stated that defendant confessed within the first 40 minutes of 
the interview and that no breaks were taken during the duration 
of the interview (R. 211). When defendant requested an attorney, 
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the interview ceased (T. 215). Defendant declined to testify, 
and he offered no other evidence rebutting deputy Corry's 
testimony. 
The trial court made the following findings: 
Well, it appears to the Court in this 
circumstance as to the voluntariness of the 
alleged statement, it doesn't appear to the 
Court that circumstances of the arrest of the 
defendant or the interview of the defendant 
was [sic] unreasonable. It appears he had an 
opportunity to terminate the interview, in 
fact ultimately did. That he was not held in 
any unreasonable circumstances. He was given 
the Miranda warning prior to any discussion 
being undertaken. He agreed to talk with the 
officer. 
(R. 216). Based on those findings, the trial court denied 
defendant's motion to suppress. In light of the unrebutted 
evidence that the State offered, the trial court did not clearly 
err or abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE 
EVIDENCE DEFENDANT CHALLENGES ON APPEAL. 
As noted supra, defendant's Point III here is identical 
to co-defendant Nield's Point II in his appeal. The State 
responded fully to that assertion in its brief in co-defendant's 
case. That argument is attached hereto as Addendum A. However, 
defendant failed to assert the "warrant particularity" issue 
below. In his motion to suppress, defendant argued only that the 
bolt cutters in question were not in plain view in the co-
defendant's apartment (R. 26-27). As noted supraf defendant's 
failure to assert a particular ground for suppression below 
precludes an appellate court from considering that ground on 
appeal. See State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 328. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction 
should be affirmed. 
DATED this 2 & day of March, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
-^JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Milton T. Harmon, attorney for defendant, 36 South Main Street, 
P.O. Box 97, Nephi, Utah 84648, this P-& day of March, 1990. 
Q^JUrJ^fb^t^ 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
KEVIN NIELD, 
Defendant-Appellant• 
Case No- 890465-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of burglary of a 
business, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202 (1978), in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and 
for Millard County, State of Utah, the Honorable Cullen Y. 
Christensen, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENT ON APPEAL 
Defendant's issues on appeal are whether defendant's 
sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against him was 
violated and whether the trial court properly denied defendant's 
motion to suppress evidence. 
Although defendant was convicted of theft, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978), a second degree felony pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(b)(i) (1978) (amended 1989), as well 
as burglary of a business, he has chosen to appeal only the 
burglary conviction. Judgment was entered in accordance with the 
two convictions on August 23, 1989 (R. 216-221). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by-
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. Vis 
In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendant, Kevin Jon Nield, was charged with burglary 
of a business and theft (R. 3, 4). Defendant filed a motion to 
suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant based on 
the belief that the warrant description of property to be seized 
was insufficiently particular (R. 30-32). The trial court denied 
defendant's motion, and defendant was convicted on both counts 
after a jury trial (R. 151-52). Defendant appeals only the 
burglary conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of May 16, 1988, at approximately 9:30 
to 10:00 p.m., Gerald Freeman, the owner of Fillmore Diesel, 
Fillmore, Utah, received information that his business might be 
burglarized that night (T. 122). He called the Millard County 
Sheriff's Department and asked for an extra patrol that evening 
(T. 82, 122). Deputy Sheriff Scott Corry received Mr. Freeman's 
call at 10:00 p.m. and checked the diesel shop at midnight. At 
that time he found the doors locked and secured (T. 83). When he 
returned at 2:30 a.m. on May 17, he found that the chain link 
securing the west bay doors had been cut (T. 84). He called Mr. 
Freeman, who immediately came to the shop and began to determine 
what had been taken (T. 86, 127). During his initial 
investigation of the burglary, Deputy Corry took photographs of 
two sets of greasy footprints left on the concrete floor of the 
shop (T. 86-87). 
Later that morning (May 17) Deputy Corry spoke with Mr. 
Freeman, who was then able to give him a preliminary list of 
missing items. That list included a sander, mig welder, power 
tools and hand tools (Suppression Hearing (S.H.) 37; T. 127). 
Because of the size of the shop and the many tools used there, a 
complete inventory of stolen items was not completed until May 18 
or 19 (S.H. 36; T. 28). Later on May 17 Mr. Freeman received 
information that he could find his missing tools at defendant's 
apartment (S.H. 48-49). He contacted Deputy Corry who obtained a 
search warrant for defendant's apartment and several vehicles. 
The description of the property subject to seizure under the 
search warrant was as follows: 
shop equipment, air tools, mig welder, desk 
calculator, auto tools stolen from Gerald D. 
Freeman, Fillmore Diesel, Fillmore, Utah on 
5/17/88 during a burglary. 
(R. 9). At 12:15 a.m. on May 18, Deputy Corry searched 
defendant's apartment and seized numerous items, including a pair 
of 18 inch bolt cutters, which were found in the clothes-eloset 
in the front room of the apartment (R. 12; S.H. 9, 20; T. 88, 
90). Defendant and co-defendant Richard Alvin Likes were then 
arre'sted and charged with burglary and theft. Mr, Freeman 
subsequently identified the bolt cutters as possibly his, since 
he was required by state law to have bolt cutters for his 
wreckers, and he had found an 18 inch set missing from one of his 
vehicles (S.H. 39-40; T. 129-30). 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the bolt cutters, 
arguing that the warrant under which they were seized lacked the 
requisite particularity (R. 30-31). Af-':er a hearing on the 
motion to suppress, the trial court denied the motion. In doing 
so it issued extensive, specific findings of fact. The court 
found that Mr. Freeman maintained a shop filled with "all types 
of small and large tools including hand tools, power tools, air 
tools and equipment of all types" needed to repair heavy 
equipment and that on the night of the burglary he was able to 
point out "several more significant items of equipment . . . 
missing such as a mig welder and • . . [a] desk calculator but 
. . was not able to identify each specific item of tools [sic] 
because of the large inventory and numerous types" he kept (R. 
58-9)• It found that Mr. Freeman could not tell specifically 
what was missing until he did a complete inventory and that in 
the meantime Mr. Freeman was informed that some of his "stuff" 
could be found in defendant's apartment (R. 59-60). The court 
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further found that Mr. Freeman reported the information to Deputy 
Corry "who proceeded to obtain a search warrant on May 11* 1988, 
with the best information he had, i.e., the description of the 
type of tools and specific items of equipment furnished by Mr. 
Freeman, short of a formal inventory" (R. 60). It found that 
Deputy Corry and Mr. Freeman had determined that at the time of 
the burglary access to the shop had been gained by cutting a 
chain securing the shop doors and that at the time of the search 
warrant execution Mr. Freeman did not know that he was missing 
bolt cutters since that item was customarily kept in a tow track 
(R. 60). The court found that when he was advised that bolt 
cutters had been found in defendant's apartment, Mr. Freeman 
checked his tow truck and determined that bolt cutters were 
missing and stated that the seized bolt cutters looked like the 
one'E missing from his truck (R. 60-61). The court found that 
the bolt cutters were capable of cutting the chain securing the 
doors of Mr. Freeman's shop (R. 61). Finally, the court found 
that Mr. Freeman had not been able to make an inventory to 
determine the missing tools until the day following the burglary 
and after the search warrant was executed. (R. 60). 
At the joint trial of defendant and co-defendant Likes, 
the bolt cutters were admitted along with testimony from an 
expert from the Utah State Crime Laboratory positively 
identifying the bolt cutters as those that had been used to cut 
the chain link at Fillmore Diesel (T. 55). The State also 
offered into evidence a pair of work boots taken from defendant. 
Deputy Corry identified their tread design as being "very 
similar" to the tread on the footprints he photographed at 
Fillmore Diesel on the night of the burglary (T. 95). Also 
received into evidence were a sander, two jack stands and a mig 
welder, found in a box underneath a pile of "junk" in the shed 
behind defendant's apartment in October, 1988, and turned over to 
the sheriff on January 5, 1989 (T. 98-100, 243-49). Mr. Freeman 
positively identified the mig welder as his and testified that he 
believed the jack stands and sanders were also his because they 
looked like his, they were found with the mig welder and his were 
still missing (T. 133-34). Angie Carpenter, an acquaintance of 
defendant, testified that defendant had told her prior to the 
burglary and theft that he was going to break into Gerald 
Freeman's shop and take what he could "get ahold [sic] of" to get 
even with him (T. 164-65). She further testified that on the 
morning after the burglary defendant told her he had broken into 
Mr. Freeman's shop and taken some equipment (T. 166-67). 
During the trial Deputy Corry testified concerning his 
interrogation of co-defendant Likes after his arrest. During the 
interrogation the co-defendant had confessed to the burglary and 
theft and, in doing so, had also implicated defendant. At trial, 
the co-defendant declined to testify, and Deputy Corry recounted 
the co-defendant's admission to him as it related to the co-
defendant's involvement in the burglary and theft (T. 222). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly admitted testimony concerning 
the co-defendant's confession as not being a violation of 
defendant's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against 
him. 
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The trial court properly admitted evidence seized 
pursuant to a valid search warrant. Even if the warrant were 
deemed technically insufficient as to certain evidence seized, 
the evidence could have been properly seized under the plain view 
doctrine. Finally, if the evidence in question is deemed to have 
been improperly admitted, there was other evidence sufficient to 
support defendant's conviction, and the error was harmless. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED TESTIMONY 
OF THE CO-DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION AS NOT BEING 
VIOLATIVE OF DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AGAINST HIM. 
Defendant argues that his right to confront witnesses 
against him, as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 12 and Utah 
2 
Constitution, was violated in the instant case when the trial 
court permitted the introduction of evidence of his co-
defendant's confession at their joint trial. Defendant premises 
his argument on the assumption that the co-defendant's confession 
was introduced as evidence against defendant and expressly 
implicated and powerfully incriminated him in the commission of 
the crime for which they were being tried. (Br. of App. at 9). 
That premise cannot be supported in light of the facts of the 
2 
At trial, defendant limited his argument to guarantees secured 
under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Since the application of independent state grounds to dispose of 
the issue was not argued at the trial level, introduction of such 
an argument is precluded on appeal. State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 
326, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Accordingly, the State will not 
analyze defendant's confrontation issue under article I, section 
12 of the Utah Constitution. 
case. A review of the testimony in question and counsels' 
lengthy arguments that preceded its admission will clarify the 
factual posture of this case and dispose of defendant's sixth 
amendment argument. 
At trial the State sought to allow Deputy Scott Corry 
to testify concerning co-defendant Likes' confession, received 
during interrogation, that defendant and he had committed the 
crime in question. Although the co-defendant's confession was 
admissible against himself as an exception to the hearsay rule, 
all parties were concerned that the testimony would not "wash 
over" and implicate defendant (T. 182-196). In determining 
whether the co-defendant's confession could be admitted, the 
trial court reviewed both United States Supreme Court and Utah 
cases. 
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S, 123 (1968), a 
postal inspector testified at the defendant's and co-defendant's 
joint trial that the co-defendant had orally confessed to him 
that both the defendant and the co-defendant had committed the 
crime in question. The trial court allowed the inspector to 
testify and thus implicate both defendant and co-defendant but 
specifically instructed the jury to disregard the co-defendant's 
admission as it applied to the defendant. The United States 
Supreme Court, in reversing the defendant's conviction, held that 
"because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite 
instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating 
extrajudicial statement in determining [defendant's] guilt, 
admission of • . . [co-defendant's] confession in . . . [their] 
joint trial violated . . . [defendant's] right of cross-
examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment." ^d. at 126. 
In Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987), the United 
States Supreme Court fully discussed the narrow Bruton exception 
to the "almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors 
follow their instructions." Ijd. at 206. There the Court stated 
that the narrow Bruton exception applied when the "facially 
incriminating confession of a nontestifying co-defendant [was] 
introduced at their joint trial." Ici. ac 207 (emphasis added). 
In Bruton, the co-defendant's testimony both "expressly 
implicated]" the defendant and was "powerfully incriminating." 
Id. at 208. In Richardson, the co-defendant's confession was 
redacted to omit all reference to the defendant, and the jury was 
instructed not to consider the co-defendant's confession against 
the defendant. In upholding the trial court's admission of the 
testimony with its limiting instruction, the Court emphasized the 
narrowness of the Bruton doctrine. It held that the 
"Confrontation Clause [was] not violated by the admission of a 
nontestifying co-defendant's confession with a proper limiting 
instruction when . . . the confession [was] redacted to eliminate 
not only the defendant's name, but any reference to his or her 
existence." Ld. at 211. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the Bruton and 
Richardson analysis of the sixth amendment right to 
confrontation. In State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987), the 
Utah Supreme Court interpreted Bruton and declined to apply it to 
the facts of that case. There, inconsistent statements made by 
co-defendants at the time of their arrest were admitted into 
evidence by the testimony of the arresting police officer.* 
Because the statements did not rise to the level of directly 
implicating either defendant, the Court did not apply Bruton, 
stating that to invoke the Bruton doctrine, "a statement must be 
powerfully and facially incriminating with respect to the other 
defendant and must directly, rather than indirectly, implicate 
the complaining defendant in the commission of the crime." Ld. at 
190 (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 207, 208 (1987)). 
In the instant case, the trial court properly limited 
the co-defendant's confession pursuant to Richardson. The 
pertinent portion of Officer Corry's testimony is as follows: 
Q. [State] What did Mr. Likes [co-defendant] 
tell you then during the interview, 
basically? 
A. [Deputy Corry] Mr. Likes [co-defendant] 
told me that he broke into Fillmore Diesel, 
that he used a set of bolt-cutters to cut the 
lock, and that he took several items from the 
business and placed them in an undisclosed 
location somewhere in the Fillmore area. 
(T. 222). 
No reference, either direct or indirect, was made to 
defendant. The statement neither powerfully nor facially 
incriminated defendant. Therefore, the Bruton doctrine is not 
applicable. 
In addition to limiting the testimony concerning the 
co-defendant's confession, the trial court here expressly 
instructed the jury as follows: 
In connection with the evidence that has been 
received in this case, ladies and gentlemen, 
there have [sic] been and offered a statement 
attributable to the defendant Likes, to him 
individually• You are instructed that 
whatever weight or credit you give to that 
statement is not to be considered in any way 
or fashion in your determination of whether 
or not the defendant Nield may be guilty or 
innocent. 
(T.;340-a) . 
The trial court limited the scope of Officer Corry's 
testimony concerning the co-defendant's confession to permit no 
reference to defendant and specifically instructed the jury that 
evidence of the co-defendant's confession could be attributed 
only to the co-defendant. In doing so, the trial court properly 
applied the protective legal standards of Richardson. The 
admission of the testimony did not violate defendant's sixth 
amendment right to confront witnesses against him. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE 
EVIDENCE DEFENDANT CHALLENGES ON APPEAL. 
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress arguing that the warrant under which the bolt 
cutters were seized did not describe them with sufficient 
particularity. In reviewing the trial court's ruling, this Court 
applies the following standard: 
In considering the trial court's action 
in denying defendant's motion to suppress, we 
will not disturb its factual evaluation 
unless the findings are clearly erroneous . . 
. . The trial judge is in the best position 
to assess the credibility and accuracy of the 
witnesses' divergent testimonies. . . . 
However, in assessing the trial court's legal 
conclusions based upon its factual findings, 
we afford it no deference but apply a 
'correction of error' standard. . . . 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(citations omitted); See also Termunde v. Cook, No, 890495, slip 
op. at 2 (Utah Feb. 6, 1990). But see State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 
119, 122 (Utah 1983); State v. Galleqos, 716 P.2d 207, 208-09 
(Utah 1985); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1268-69 (Utah 1987) 
(which suggest that the "clearly erroneous" standard applied to 
the trial court's factual evaluation and its legal conclusion). 
In the instant case defendant does not challenge the trial 
court's factual findings, as delineated in its ruling on 
defendant's motion to suppress and outlined supra. Therefore, 
this court need only assess the trial court's legal conclusion 
that the description of items to be seized in the warrant was 
constitutionally sufficient. 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
requires that search warrants particularly describe articles to 
be seized. However, an exact match between the property seized 
and the description in the warrant is not constitutionally 
required. In State v. Galleqos, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The decision to seize must be judicial, 
as opposed to administrative, and the warrant 
must be sufficiently particular to guide the 
officer to the thing intended to be seized, 
thereby minimizing the danger of unwarranted 
invasion of privacy. Accordingly, the line 
between what is and what is not sufficiently 
particular must be drawn with a view to 
accomplishment of the constitutional purpose 
and necessarily varies with the circumstances 
and with the nature of the property to be 
seized. 
(footnote citations omitted). See also State v. Anderson 701 
P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1988) ("The adequacy of a description in a 
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search warrant depends in every instance upon the particular 
facts of the case"); Namen v. State, 665 P.2d 557, 560 (Alaska 
1983) ("The requisite degree of particularity must be determined 
by the totality of the circumstances in each case."). In the 
instant case, Deputy Corry, acting on a tip concerning the 
whereabouts of stolen items and fearing that the items might be 
disposed of quickly, obtained a search warrant based on the most 
complete information he had available to him at the time (R. 7, 
60). A complete inventory of items missing was not available to 
him at the time of the search, and his reliance on the warrant in 
seizing the bolt cutters was justified. This conclusion is 
consistent with the language from a case cited with approval in 
Gallegos, 712 P.2d at 209 n.10: 
The amount of particularity required in 
naming the items to be seized for a given 
warrant to be valid will vary with the 
circumstances and with the ability of the 
complainants to be specific. 
People v. Harmon, 90 Ill.App.3d 753, 755, 46 111.Dec. 27, 29, 413 
N.E.2d 467, 469 (1980) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
Defendant's repeated assertion that the "shop 
equipment, air tools, mig welder, desk calculator, auto tools" 
warrant description is "generic," that is, applicable to an 
entire class of property, and his reliance on State v. Gallegos 
as being factually similar to the instant case are unjustified. 
In Gallegos the warrant ordered seizure of "all controlled 
substances and stolen property." There, the Utah Supreme Court, 
while holding that the description "stolen property" was 
insufficiently particular, stated that general descriptions could 
be held sufficient "[in cases] where attendant circumstances 
prevented a detailed description from being given." State v. 
Galleqos# 712 P.2d at 209, 210 (quoting Namen v. State, 665 P.2d 
at 561-62). Although the warrant description in the instant case 
is substantively more particular than in Gallegos, even if it 
could be termed "general," it would fall under the Namen 
exception just noted. The trial court's factual findings that 
the victim was not able to make an inventory until after the 
search and that Deputy Corry proceeded zo obtain a search warrant 
with the best information he had are unchallenged by defendant 
and are dispositive of the issue. The trial court did not err in 
its legal conclusion denying defendant's motion to suppress. 
Even if this Court were to conclude that the search 
warrant description was open to challenge, the bolt cutters could 
have been seized validly under the plain view doctrine. As 
stated in State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389 (Utah 1986), seizure 
under the plain view doctrine requires that 1) the officer be 
lawfully present; 2) the evidence be in plain view; and 3) the 
evidence be clearly incriminating. The "clearly incriminating" 
standard requires an officer to have probable cause to believe 
that the item to be seized is evidence of a crime. Id. at 390. 
See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987); State v. Babbell, 
770 P.2d 987, 993 (Utah 1989). Here, Deputy Corry was present in 
defendant's apartment and searching the closet therein pursuant 
to a validly issued search warrant. The bolt cutters were in 
plain view in the closet and Deputy Corry had probable cause to 
believe them to be evidence of the crime. It was Deputy Corry 
who had first discovered the burglary of Fillmore Diesel and he 
knew that the chain link securing the doors of the shop had been 
cut. Bolt cutters capable of cutting chain link, whether or not 
they belonged to the victim, could be properly seized as evidence 
of the crime. 
Finally, even if this Court were to conclude that the 
bolt cutters were erroneously admitted as evidence, enough other 
evidence was admitted to sustain defendant's conviction, and the 
error would be harmless. Evidence of defendant's footprints on 
the shop floor found on the night of the burglary, stolen items 
recovered from the shop behind defendant's apartment, and 
testimony by Angie Carpenter that defendant told her he intended 
to break into Fillmore Diesel and that he had done so support 
defendant's conviction. No reasonable likelihood exists that 
without the admission of the bolt cutters there would have been a 
different result. See State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 129 (Utah 
1986) (citing State v. Hutchinson, 655 ?.2d 635 (Utah 1982); Utah 
R. Evid. 103(a), Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a)). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction 
should be affirmed. 
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